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Discrete Non Neterminism and Nash Equilibria
for Strategy-Based Games
Ste´phane Le Roux⋆
E´cole normale supe´rieure de Lyon, Universite´ de Lyon, LIP, CNRS, INRIA, UCBL
Abstract. Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilib-
rium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weak-
ening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the
existence of a weakened equilibrium. Nash’s approach to the problem for
strategic games is probabilistic, i.e. continuous, and static. CP and BR
approaches for CP and BR games are discrete and dynamic. This paper
proposes an approach that lies between those two different approaches:
a discrete and static approach. multi strategic games are introduced as
a formalism that is able to express both sequential and simultaneous
decision-making, which promises a good modelling power. multi strate-
gic games are a generalisation of strategic games and sequential graph
games that still enjoys a Cartesian product structure, i.e. where agent
actually choose their strategies. A pre-fixed point result allows guaran-
teeing existence of discrete and non deterministic equilibria. On the one
hand, these equilibria can be computed with polynomial (low) complex-
ity. On the other hand, they are effective in terms of recommendation,
as shown by a numerical example.
Keywords:Abstract strategic games, Nash equilibrium, discrete non-determinism,
discrete equilibrium, constructive, fixed-point, multi-strategic games.
1 Introduction
Not all strategic games have a (pure) Nash equilibrium. On the one hand, Nash’s
probabilistic approach copes with this existence problem with an ad hoc solu-
tion: Nash’s solution is dedicated to a setting with real-valued payoff functions.
On the other hand, CP and BR games propose an abstract and general approach
that is applicable to many types of game. Both approaches generalise the notion
of Nash equilibrium and guarantee the existence of a weakened Nash equilib-
rium. There are two main differences between the two approaches though. First,
Nash’s approach considers finite objects and yields continuous objects, whereas
the CP and BR approach preserves finiteness. Second, Nash’s approach is static,
whereas the CP and BR approach is dynamic: Nash’s approach is static because
a probabilistic Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a probabilistic status quo
⋆ http://perso.ens-lyon.fr/stephane.le.roux/. Now working at INRIA-Microsoft Re-
search. I thank Pierre Lescanne for his comments on the draft of this paper.
that is (pure) Nash equilibrium of a probabilised game. The Cartesian product
structure enables a static approach. CP and BR approach is dynamic because
a CP or BR equilibrium can be interpreted as a limit set of states that are
tied together by explicit forces. It may be interesting to mix features from both
approaches, and to present for instance a discrete and static notion of equilib-
rium. Actually, such an approach was already adopted in [4], whose purpose
was to provide sequential tree games with a notion of discrete non determin-
istic equilibrium. This approach assumed partially ordered payoffs, and simple
”backward induction” guarantees existence of non deterministic subgame perfect
equilibrium. This result is superseded by [5] which adopts a completely different
approach, but the discrete non determinism spirit can be further exploited.
1.1 Contribution
This paper introduces the concept of abstract strategic games, which corresponds
to traditional strategic games where real-valued payoff functions have been re-
placed with abstract objects called outcomes. In addition, the usual total order
over the reals has been replaced with binary relations, one per agent, that ac-
count for agent’s preferences over the outcomes. Abstract strategic games thus
generalise strategic games like abstract sequential tree games generalise sequen-
tial tree games. A notion of Nash equilibrium is defined, but not all abstract
strategic games have a Nash equilibrium since traditional strategic games al-
ready lack this property.
Like Nash did for traditional strategic games, an attempt is made to introduce
probabilities into these new games. However, it is mostly a failure because there
does not seem to exist any extension of a poset to its barycentres that is relevant
to the purpose. So, instead of saying that ”an agent chooses a given strategy with
some probability”, this paper proposes to say that ”the agent may choose the
strategy”, without further specification.
The discrete non determinism proposed above is implemented in the notion
of non deterministic best response (ndbr ) multi strategic game. As hinted by
the terminology, the best response approach is preferred over the convertibility
preference approach for this specific purpose. (Note that discrete non determin-
ism for abstract strategic games can be implemented in a formalism that is more
specific and simpler than ndbr multi strategic games, but this general formalism
will serve further purposes.) This paper defines the notion of ndbr equilibrium
in these games, and a pre-fixed point result helps prove a sufficient condition
for every ndbr multi strategic game to have an ndbr equilibrium. An embedding
of abstract strategic games into ndbr multi strategic games provides abstract
strategic games with a notion of non deterministic (nd ) equilibrium that gen-
eralises the notion of Nash equilibrium. Since every abstract strategic game has
an nd equilibrium (under some condition), the discrete non deterministic ap-
proach succeeds where the probabilistic approach fails, i.e. is irrelevant. This
new approach lies between Nash’s approach, which is continuous and static, and
the abstract approaches of CP and BR games, which are discrete and dynamic.
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Indeed, this notion of nd equilibrium is discrete and static. It is deemed static be-
cause it makes use of the Cartesian product structure, which allows interpreting
an equilibrium as a ”static state of the game”.
This paper also defines the notion of multi strategic game that is very simi-
lar to the notion of ndbr multi strategic game, while slightly less abstract. multi
strategic games are actually a generalisation of both abstract strategic games
and sequential graph games. Informally, they are games where a strategic game
takes place at each node of a graph. (A different approach to ”games network”
can be found in [7]) They can thus model within a single game both sequential
and simultaneous decision-making mechanisms. An embedding of multi strate-
gic games into ndbr multi strategic games provides multi strategic games with
a notion of non deterministic (nd ) equilibrium. In addition, a numerical exam-
ple shows that the constructive proof of nd equilibrium existence can serve as a
recommmendation to agents on how to play, while the notion of Nash equilib-
rium, as its stands, cannot lead to any kind of recommendation.
1.2 Contents
Section 2 defines abstract strategic games and their abstract Nash equilibria.
Section 3 considers probabilities to relax the definition of Nash equilibrium in
abstract strategic games, and concludes that discrete non determinism is re-
quired. Section 4 proves a pre-fixed point result. Section 5 introduces the non
deterministic best response multi strategic games and their non deterministic
best response equilibria. Then it gives a sufficient condition for these games to
have such an equilibrium. Section 6 embeds abstract strategic games into ndbr
multi strategic games, and thus provides a notion of (existing) non deterministic
equilibrium for abstract strategic games. It also gives a few examples. Section 7
defines multi strategic games and embeds them into ndbr multi strategic games,
and thus provides a notion of non deterministic equilibrium for multi strategic
games.
2 Abstract Strategic Games
This section defines abstract strategic games and their abstract Nash equilibria.
Two embeddings show that abstract strategic games can be seen as either CP
games or BR games when preferences are acyclic.
Informally, abstract strategic games are traditional strategic games where
real-valued payoff functions have been replaced with abstract objects named
outcomes. In addition for each agent, one binary relation over outcomes accounts
for the preference of the agent for some outcomes over some others.
Definition 1 (Abstract strategic games) Abstract strategic games are 4-
tuples 〈A, S, P, (⊳a)a∈A〉 where:
– A is a non-empty set of agents,
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– S =
⊗
a∈A Sa is the Cartesian product of non-empty sets of individual strate-
gies,
– P : S → Oc is a function mapping strategy profiles to outcomes.
– ⊳a is a binary relation over outcomes, and oc⊳a oc
′ says that agent a prefers
oc′ over oc.
The example below shows a traditional strategic game on the left-hand side,
and an abstract strategic game on the right-hand side.
h1 h2
v1 0 2 1 1
v2 0 1 2 0
h1 h2
v1 oc1 oc2
v2 oc3 oc4
For a given game, each agent can compare strategy profiles by comparing
their outcomes using the function P .
Notation 1 Let 〈A, S, P, (⊳a)a∈A〉 be an abstract strategic game and let s and
s′ be in S.
s⊳a s
′ ∆= P (s)⊳a P (s
′)
Happiness of an agent is defined below, in a convertibility preference style.
Definition 2 (Agent happiness) Let 〈A, S, P, (⊳a)a∈A〉
Happy(a, s)
∆
= ∀s′ ∈ S, ¬(s′−a = s−a ∧ s⊳a s
′)
As usual, Nash equilibrium means happiness for all agents.
Definition 3 (Nash Equilibrium)
Eqg(s)
∆
= ∀a ∈ A, Happy(a, s)
There exists a natural embedding of abstract strategic games into CP games,
as described below.
Lemma 4 Let g = 〈A, S, P, (⊳a)a∈A〉 be a strategic game.
s //
a
oo s′
∆
= s−a = s
′
−a,
Then g′ = 〈A, S, ( //a
oo )a∈A, (⊳a)a∈A〉 is a CP game and the embedding preserves
and reflects Nash equilibria.
Eqg(s) ⇔ Eqg′(s)
When agents’ preferences are acyclic, there exists also a natural embedding
of abstract strategic games into BR games, as described below.
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Lemma 5 Let g = 〈A, S, P, (⊳a)a∈A〉 be a strategic game. Assume that the ⊳a
are acyclic.
BRa(s)
∆
= {s−a} × {s
′ ∈ Sa | ∀s
′′ ∈ Sa, ¬(s−a; s
′
⊳a s−a; s
′′)}
Then g′ = 〈A, S, (BRa)a∈A〉 is a BR game and the embedding preserves and
reflects Nash equilibria.
Eqg(s) ⇔ Eqg′(s)
3 From Continuous to Discrete non determinism
This section tries to apply Nash’s probabilistic compromise to an instance of
abstract strategic games. Facing a half-failure, it notices that continuous non
determinism, i.e. probabilities, carry ”too much” information. Indeed, only a
notion of discrete non deterministic strategies is needed to characterise the prob-
abilistic Nash equilibria of the example. These non deterministic strategies are
defined as non-empty subsets of strategies.
Consider the following abstract strategic game involving agents v and h. The
game has no (pure) Nash equilibrium.
oc1 ⊳V oc3 oc3 ⊳H oc4
oc4 ⊳V oc2 oc2 ⊳H oc1
h1 h2
v1 oc1 oc2
v2 oc3 oc4
Mixed strategies for abstract strategic games are defined the same way they
are defined for traditional strategic games, i.e. through probability distributions.
Mixed strategy profiles are of the following form, where α and β are probabilities
that are chosen by agent v and agent h respectively.
αβ(v1, h1) + α(1 − β)(v1, h2) + (1− α)β(v2, h1) + (1− α)(1 − β)(v2, h2)
In the traditional setting, this yields expected payoff functions. Since pay-
offs and probabilities are both real numbers, the expected payoffs are also real
numbers. It is therefore natural to compare them by using the usual total order
over the reals, i.e. the same order that is used when comparing payoffs of pure
strategy profiles. In the abstract setting though, mixing the strategies induces
a new type of object, say ”expected outcomes”. These expected outcomes are
objects of the following form, where α and β are probabilities that are chosen
by agent v and agent h respectively.
αβoc1 + α(1 − β)oc2 + (1− α)βoc3 + (1 − α)(1 − β)oc4
These new objects are not outcomes a priori, so there is no obvious way to
compare them a priori. The most natural way may be the following one. When
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both α and β are either 0 or 1, the expected outcome looks like an outcome. For
instance, if α and β equal 1, the expected outcome is as follows.
1.oc1 + 0.oc2 + 0.oc3 + 0.oc4
Along the two preference relations that are defined in the strategic game
above, it is possible to define preferences among these four specific expected
outcomes. For instance, oc1⊳v oc3 yields the following.
1.oc1 + 0.oc2 + 0.oc3 + 0.oc4 ⊳v 0.oc1 + 0.oc2 + 1.oc3 + 0.oc4
When either α or β is either 0 or 1, the new preference relations can be
extended naturally, i.e. consistently with the original preferences. Informally, if
agent v prefers oc3 over oc1 then, by extension, he will prefer mixed outcomes
giving more weight to oc3 than to oc1. For instance, if α
′ < α then the preference
of agent v is extended as follows.
αoc1 + 0.oc2 + (1 − α)oc3 + 0.oc4 ⊳v α
′oc1 + 0.oc2 + (1− α
′)oc3 + 0.oc4
However, extending non-trivially the preferences to all expected outcomes
would require an artificial choice. Indeed, consider the following two expected
outcomes obtained by α = 12 and β =
1
2 for the first one, and by α =
1
2 and
β = 13 for the second one.
1
4
oc1 +
1
4
oc2 +
1
4
oc3 +
1
4
oc4
1
6
oc1 +
1
3
oc2 +
1
6
oc3 +
1
3
oc4
In the strategic game above, these expected outcomes correspond to mixed
strategy profiles that agent h can convert to each other. On the one hand, the
weights attributed to oc1 and oc2 are better in the first expected outcome, accord-
ing to h. On the other hand, the weights attributed to oc3 and oc4 are better in
the second expected outcome, according to h. These two arguments sound ”con-
tradictory”. Moreover, there is nothing in the original preference relation that
suggests to give priority to one argument over the other. So it is reasonable to say
that h prefers neither of these expected outcomes. Thus are defined the exten-
sions of the preference relations. This completes the definition of the (probabilis-
tic) abstract strategic game derived from the finite abstract strategic game exam-
ple above. In such a setting, the probabilistic Nash equilibria are the mixed strat-
egy profiles αβ(v1, h1)+α(1−β)(v1, h2)+(1−α)β(v2, h1)+(1−α)(1−β)(v2, h2),
where 0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1. Therefore almost all mixed strategy profiles are
probabilistic Nash equilibria, which does not seem not be a desirable property.
In the probabilistic setting, a strategy of an agent is said to be ”used” if the
agent gives a non-zero probability to this strategy. With this terminology, the
above remark can be rephrased as follows. In the above strategic game with its
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above probabilistic extension, a mixed strategy profile is a probabilistic Nash
equilibrium iff both agents use both their strategies. This suggests that, in
abstract strategic games, the actual values of the probabilities are irrelevant to
the Nash equilibrium predicate. Only their being zero or not is relevant. This
motivates the definition of discrete non deterministic strategies that only says
which strategies are used. Note that an agent must use at least one strategy,
like in the probabilistic (and the pure) setting. For each agent, a discrete non
deterministic strategy can therefore be seen as a non-empty subset of the set of
its strategies.
4 A Simple Pre-Fixed Point Result
This section proves a pre-fixed-point result, i.e. the existence of a y such that
y  F (y) for all F and  that comply with given constraints.
Meet semi-lattices are defined below like in the literature. They are posets
that guarantee existence of greatest lower bound of any two elements. The ter-
minology of ”meet” seems to come from the set-theoretic intersection.
Definition 6 (Meet semi-lattice) A meet semi-lattice is a partially ordered
set (S,), i.e. the binary relation  is reflexive and transitive, such that any
sets with two elements has a greatest lower bound.
Defined as a specific type of posets, meet semi-lattices have algebraic proper-
ties. (Actually, meet semi-lattices are sometimes defined as algebraic structures
from where an ordering is derived.)
Definition 7 In a partially ordered set, a greatest lower bound of two elements
is unique, which induces the binary operator ”greatest lower bound”. This oper-
ator is commutative and associative, which enables the definition of the greatest
lower bound of any non-empty finite subset of S. Let us call inf this greatest
lower bound function.
Given a function from a meet semi-lattice to itself, a meeting point is an
element of the lattice such that every decreasing sequence that starts with the
meeting point is not too much ”scattered” by the function. This is accurately
described below.
Definition 8 Let (S,) be a meet semi-lattice with least element m, and let inf
be the infimum function corresponding to . Let F be a function from S to itself
and let x be in S. Assume that for all x1 . . . xn such that m 6= x1  · · ·  xn  x,
we have inf(F (x1), . . . , F (xn), x) 6= m. If x 6= m then x is said to be a F -meeting
point, and one writes MF (x).
The F -meeting point predicate is preserved by the greatest lower bound
operator used with the image of the point by F , as stated below.
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Lemma 9 Let (S,) be a meet semi-lattice with least element m; let inf be the
infimum function corresponding to ; and let F be a function from S to itself.
The following formula holds.
MF (x) ⇒ MF ◦ inf(x, F (x))
Proof Assume MF (x), so x and m are different. By reflexivity x  x, so
inf(x, F (x)) 6= m by definition of meeting point. Assume m 6= x1  · · · 
xn  inf(x, F (x)), so m 6= x1  · · ·  xn  x  x since inf(x, F (x))  x
by definition of inf . So inf(F (x1), . . . , F (xn), F (x), x) 6= m since x is a F -
meeting point. Therefore inf(F (x1), . . . , F (xn), inf(F (x), x)) 6= m, by associa-
tivity of the greatest lower bound operator underlying the infimum function inf .
So inf(x, F (x)) is a F -meeting point. 
The F -meeting point predicate preservation can be combined with the as-
sumption that there exists no infinite strictly decreasing sequence. In this case,
iteration of lemma 9 yields a non-trivial pre fixed point of F .
Lemma 10 Let (S,) be a meet semi-lattice with least element m, and assume
that  is well-founded. Let F be a function from S to itself. If there exists a F -
meeting point, then there exists a F pre fixed point different from m, i.e. there
exists y 6= m such that y  F (y).
Proof Assume MF (x0). An infinite sequence of elements of S is built as
follows. It starts with x0, and it is gradually defined by induction. Assume
xn, . . . , x0 such that MF (xn), and xk+1 = inf(xk, F (xk)) for all 0 ≤ k < n. Let
xn+1 = inf(xn, F (xn)). By Lemma 9,MF (xn+1). By well-foundness assumption,
there exists n such that xn+1 = xn, which means that xn = inf(xn, F (xn)), so
xn  F (xn). Moreover, MF (xn) by construction of the sequence, so xn 6= m. 
5 Non deterministic best Response multi Strategic
Games
Using the concept of discrete non deterministic strategy, this section defines non
deterministic best response multi strategic games and their non deterministic
Nash equilibria. This section also proves a sufficient condition for non deter-
ministic Nash equilibrium existence in every non deterministic best response
sequential graph game. These results will be used to guarantee existence of
non deterministic equilibrium for abstract strategic games and sequential graph
game.
Informally, non deterministic best response multi strategic games involve
agents who play on several (abstractions of) strategic games at the same time.
Agents’ strategies are non deterministic, i.e. on each game each agent has to
choose one or more (pure) strategies among his available strategies. When all
the opponents of an agent have chosen their non deterministic strategies on all
games, a function tells agent a what his non deterministic best responses are.
These games are formally defined below.
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Definition 11 (Non deterministic best response multi strategic games)
An ndbr multi strategic game is pair 〈(Sia)
i∈I
a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉 complying with the
following.
– I is a non-empty set of indices and A is a non-empty set of agents.
– For all a in A, BRa is a function from Σ−a to Σa,
where Σ =
⊗
a∈AΣa and Σa =
⊗
i∈I P(S
i
a)−{∅} and Σ−a =
⊗
a′∈A−{a}Σa′ .
Elements of Σa are called nd strategies for a, and elements of Σ are called nd
strategy profiles.
Informally, an agent is happy with an nd strategy profile if its own nd strategy
is included in its best responses against other agents’ nd strategies. Agents’
happiness is formally defined as follows.
Definition 12 (Happiness) Let g = 〈(Sia)
i∈I
a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉 be an ndbr multi
strategic game, and let σ be in Σ.
Happy(σ, a)
∆
= σa ⊆ BRa(σ−a)
As usual, (non deterministic) Nash equilibrium amounts to happiness for all
agents.
Definition 13 (Non deterministic Nash equilibrium) Let g be an ndbr
multi strategic game, g = 〈(Sia)
i∈I
a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉.
Eqg(σ)
∆
= ∀a ∈ A, Happy(σ, a)
The individual best response functions can be combined into a collective best
response function from the non deterministic profiles into themselves.
Definition 14 (Combined best response) Given an ndbr multi strategic game
with (BRa)a∈A a family of agent best responses. The combined best response is
a function from Σ to itself defined as follows.
BR(σ)
∆
=
⊗
a∈A
BRa(σ−a)
Through the combined best response function, the non deterministic Nash
equilibria are characterised below as nd profiles included in their images by the
combined best response.
Lemma 15 An ndbr equilibrium for g = 〈(Sia)
i∈I
a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉 is characterised
as follows.
Eqg(σ) ⇔ σ ⊆ BR(σ)
Like in BR games, it is easy to define agents’ strict happiness.
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Definition 16 (Strict happiness) Let g = 〈(Sia)
i∈I
a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉 be an ndbr
multi strategic game, and let σ be in Σ.
Happy+(σ, a)
∆
= σa = BRa(σ−a)
Then, (non deterministic) strict Nash equilibrium is defined as strict happi-
ness for all agents.
Definition 17 (Non deterministic strict Nash equilibrium) Let g be an
ndbr multi strategic game, g = 〈(Sia)
i∈I
a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉, and let σ be in Σ.
Eq+g (σ)
∆
= ∀a ∈ A, Happy+(σ, a)
The following embedding of non deterministic best response multi strategic
games into BR games preserves an reflects equilibria.
Lemma 18 Let g = 〈(Sia)
i∈I
a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉 be an ndbr multi strategic game.
Define BR′a with a Cartesian product below, for σ ∈ Σ.
BR′a(σ)
∆
= {σ−a} ×
⊗
i∈I
P(BRia(σ−a))− {∅}
Where BRia(σ−a) is the i-projection of BRa(σ−a). Then the object g
′ defined by
g′ = 〈A, Σ, (BR′a)a∈A〉 is a BR game and Nash equilibria correspond as follows.
Eqg′(σ) ⇔ Eqg(σ)
Proof Let σ be in Σ =
⊗
a∈A
⊗
i∈I(P(S
i
a) − {∅}). The following chain of
equivalences proves the claim. Eqg′(σ) ⇔ ∀a, σ ∈ BR′a(σ) ⇔ ∀a, σ ∈ {σ−a} ×⊗
i∈I P(BR
i
a(σ−a)) − {∅} ⇔ ∀a, σa ∈
⊗
i∈I P(BR
i
a(σ−a)) − {∅} ⇔ ∀a, σa ⊆
BRa(σ−a) ⇔ Eqg(σ) 
The remainder of the section invokes the fixed-point results of section 4, but
prior to that, a meet lattice needs to be identified.
Lemma 19 Given an ndbr multi strategic game 〈(Sia)
i∈I
a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉, the poset
(Σ ∪ {∅},⊆) is a meet semi-lattice with least element ∅.
A first equilibrium existence result is given below.
Lemma 20 Given an ndbr multi strategic game 〈(Sia)
i∈I
a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉, if there
exists a BR-meeting point, then there exists a non deterministic Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof By lemma 10, if there exists a BR-meeting point, then there exists a
non-empty pre fixed point σ for BR, i.e. there exists σ 6= ∅ such that σ ⊆ BR(σ).
It is an ndbr equilibrium by definition. 
10
The main equilibrium existence result is stated below.
Lemma 21 Consider an ndbr multi strategic game 〈(Sia)
i∈I
a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉. Let
σ be in Σ. Assume that for all agents a, for all γ1 . . . γn in Σ−a, if γn ⊆ · · · ⊆
γ1 ⊆ σ−a then ∩1≤k≤nBRa(γk) ∩ σa 6= ∅. In this case, the game has an ndbr
equilibrium.
Proof By lemma 20, it suffices to show that there exists a BR-meeting point.
Let us prove that σ is such a meeting point. First of all, σ is non-empty since it
belongs to Σ. Second, assume σ1 . . . σn in Σ such that σ1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ σn ⊆ σ. So for
all agents a, σ1−a ⊆ · · · ⊆ σ
n
−a ⊆ σ−a. By assumption, ∩1≤k≤nBRa(σ
k
−a)∩σa 6= ∅,
which amounts to (∩1≤k≤nBR(σk)∩ σ)a 6= ∅. Since this holds for all a, we have
∩1≤k≤nBR(σk) ∩ σ 6= ∅. Therefore σ is a BR-meeting point. 
Equilibria are preserved when ”increasing” the best response functions, as
stated below.
Lemma 22 Let g = 〈(Sia)
i∈I
a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉 and g
′ = 〈(Sia)
i∈I
a∈A, (BR
′
a)a∈A〉 be
two ndbr multi strategic games such that for all a in A, for all γ in Σ−a,
BRa(γ) ⊆ BR′a(γ). In this case, the following implication holds.
Eqg(σ) ⇒ Eqg′(σ)
Proof Since for all a in A, for all γ in Σ−a, BRa(γ) ⊆ BR′a(γ), it follows
that for all σ in Σ, BR(σ) ⊆ BR′(σ). So, σ ⊆ BR(σ) implies σ ⊆ BR′(σ). 
6 Discrete and Static Compromising Equilibrium for
Abstract Strategic Games
Subsection 6.1 embeds abstract strategic games into ndbr multi strategic games,
and thus provides a notion of non deterministic Nash equilibrium for abstract
strategic games. Finally it proves equilibrium existence for all abstract strategic
games. Subsection 6.2 gives an example of such non deterministic Nash equilib-
rium on a strategic game with real-valued payoff functions. The building of the
equilibrium is described step by step. Subsection 6.3 suggests by a numerical
example that the constructive proof of existence of such an equilibrium yields a
notion of recommendation that is better on average than playing randomly.
6.1 non deterministic Equilibrium Existence
The following definition extends orders over functions’ codomains to orders over
(restrictions of) functions.
Definition 23 Let f and f ′ be functions of type A→ B, and let A′ be a subset
of A. Let ≺ be an irreflexive binary relation over B, and let  be its reflexive
closure.
f A
′
f ′
∆
= ∀x ∈ A′, f(x)  f ′(x)
f ≺A
′
f ′
∆
= f A
′
f ′ ∧ ∃x ∈ A′, f(x) ≺ f ′(x)
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One simply writes f ≺ f ′ instead of f ≺A f ′.
For example if the two functions are represented by vectors of naturals with
the usual total order, then (1, 1) < (1, 2), (0, 2) < (1, 2) and (0, 1) < (1, 2).
The extension above preserves strict partial orders, as stated below.
Lemma 24 If ≺ is a strict partial order over B, then the derived ≺A over
functions of type A→ B is also a strict partial order.
Given finitely many functions of the same type, given an order on the codomain,
given finitely many subsets of the domain that are totally ordered by inclusion,
one of these functions is maximal for the extension order with respect to each of
the subsets. This is proved by the following.
Lemma 25 Let E be a finite set of functions of type A → B. Let ≺ be an
irreflexive and transitive binary relation over B, and let  be its reflexive closure.
For any ∅ 6= A0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ An ⊆ A there exists an f in E that is maximal with
respect to all the extended orders from ≺A0 to ≺An.
Proof By induction on n. First case, n = 0. There exists an f in E that is
maximal, i.e. have no successor, with respect to ≺A0 since ≺A0 is a partial order.
Second case, assume that the claim holds for n and let ∅ 6= A0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ An+1 be
subsets of A. Let f in E be maximal with respect to all the ≺A0 · · · ≺An . Let f ′
be maximal with respect to ≺An+1 among the functions in E that coincide with
f on An. Since ∅ 6= A0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ An, the function f ′ is maximal in E with respect
to all the ≺A0 · · · ≺An . Let f ′′ in E be such that f ′ An+1 f ′′. So f ′ An f ′′
since An ⊆ An+1. Therefore f ′ and f ′′ coincide on An by maximality of f ′ with
respect to ≺An . Since f and f ′ coincide on An, the functions f and f ′′ also
coincide on An. Therefore ¬(f ′ ≺An+1 f ′′) by definition of f ′, which shows that
f ′ is also maximal with respect to ≺An+1. 
Below, an ndbr multi strategic game is built from an abstract strategic game.
This ndbr multi strategic game always has an ndbr equilibrium. In the notation
s⊳γa s
′ below, the strategies s and s′ are seen as functions from Sa to the out-
comes.
Lemma 26 Let g = 〈A, S, P, (⊳a)a∈A〉 be an abstract strategic game. Assume
that the ⊳a are strict partial orders, i.e. irreflexive and transitive. For each agent
a and each γ in Σ−a, the following defines a subset of Sa.
BRa(γ)
∆
= {s ∈ Sa | ∀s′ ∈ Sa, ¬(s⊳
S−a
a s′) ∧
∀s′ ∈ Sa, ¬(s⊳γa s
′) ∧
∃c ∈ γ, ∀s′ ∈ Sa, ¬(s⊳
{c}
a s′) }
The object 〈(Sa)a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉 is an ndbr multi strategic game, and it has an
ndbr equilibrium.
12
Proof Let a be an agent. First note that, through the function P , every
strategy s in Sa can be seen as a function from S−a to the outcomes Oc. Let
γ1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ γn be inΣ−a and let c be in γ1. According to lemma 25, there exists an
s in Sa that is maximal with respect to ⊳
{c}
a ,⊳γ1a , . . . ,⊳
γn
a ,⊳
S−a
a . By definition
of BRa (third conjunct), this strategy s is in all the BRa(γ1), . . . , BRa(γn).
First, this shows that BRa returns non-empty sets, so 〈(Sa)a∈A, (BRa)a∈A〉 is
indeed an ndbr multi strategic game. Second, this game has an ndbr equilibrium
by lemma 21. 
The ndbr equilibrium for the derived ndbr multi strategic game is called a non
deterministic equilibrium for the original abstract strategic game. Other similar
definitions are possible for non deterministic equilibrium. Especially definitions
more generous than the one in lemma 26, which guarantee the existence of a
non deterministic equilibrium, according to lemma 22. This yields the following
lemma.
Lemma 27 Let g = 〈A, S, P, (⊳a)a∈A〉 be a strategic game. Assume that the
⊳a are strict partial orders, i.e. irreflexive and transitive. For each agent a and
each γ in Σ−a, the following defines three subsets of Sa.
BR1a(γ)
∆
= {s ∈ Sa | ∀s
′ ∈ Sa, ¬(s⊳
S−a
a s
′)}
BR2a(γ)
∆
= {s ∈ Sa | ∀s
′ ∈ Sa, ¬(s⊳
γ
a s
′)}
BR3a(γ)
∆
= {s ∈ Sa | ∃c ∈ γ, ∀s
′ ∈ Sa, ¬(s⊳
{c}
a s
′)}
BR4a(γ)
∆
= {s ∈ Sa | ∀s
′ ∈ Sa, ∃c ∈ γ, ¬(s⊳
{c}
a s
′)}
The object 〈A, S, (BRia)a∈A〉, for i between 1 and 4, is an ndbr multi strategic
game, and it has an ndbr equilibrium.
The first three BRia above correspond tho the three conjuncts of the BRa of
lemma 26, and BR4a is even more generous than BR
2
a. Note that BR
2 and BR4
somewhat relate to the notions of dominated strategy, studied in [2] and [6], and
rationalizability, studied in [1] and [8]. These notions are more recently discussed
in [3], for instance. (These notions are also related to ”backward induction”, but
this thesis does not further explore the matter.)
The rest of the subsection discusses a few properties of these equilibria.
Definition 28 (Cartesian union) Let
⊗
i∈ I Ai be a cartesian product. The
Cartesian union is defined as follows within
⊗
i∈ I Ai.
pi(D)
∆
= {xi | x ∈ D}
B ∪× C
∆
=
⊗
i∈ I
pi(B) ∪ pi(C)
Where pi is the projection on Ai.
The equilibria related to BR1 define a simple structure, as stated below.
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Lemma 29 The ndbr equilibria related to BR1 are the elements of Σ that are
included in
⊗
a∈A{s ∈ Sa | ∀s
′ ∈ Sa, ¬(s⊳
S−a
a s′)}.
Proof For all σ in Σ, BR1(σ) =
⊗
a∈A{s ∈ Sa | ∀s
′ ∈ Sa, ¬(s⊳
S−a
a s′)}. 
The following lemma states that the ndbr equilibria related to BR3 define a
Cartesian union lattice.
Lemma 30 Let g = 〈A, S, P, (⊳a)a∈A〉 be a strategic game. Assume that the ⊳a
are strict partial orders, i.e. irreflexive and transitive. If equilibrium is defined
through BR3 then the following holds.
Eqg(σ) ∧ Eqg(σ
′) ⇒ Eqg(σ ∪
× σ′)
Proof It suffices to prove that σ ∪× σ′ ⊆ BR3(σ ∪× σ′). Let s be in σ ∪× σ′.
If s is in σ then it is also in BR3(σ) by equilibrium assumption. So for every
agent a, there exists c in σ−a (so c is also in σ−a ∪
× σ′−a) such that for all s
′ in
Sa, neg(s⊳
{c}
a s′). Therefore s is in BR3(σ ∪× σ′). Same scenario if s is in σ′.
So σ ∪× σ′ ⊆ BR3(σ ∪× σ′). 
The following lemma states that the ndbr equilibria related to BR4 define a
Cartesian union lattice.
Lemma 31 Let g = 〈A, S, P, (⊳a)a∈A〉 be a strategic game. Assume that the ⊳a
are strict partial orders, i.e. irreflexive and transitive. If equilibrium is defined
through BR4 then the following holds.
Eqg(σ) ∧ Eqg(σ
′) ⇒ Eqg(σ ∪
× σ′)
Proof It suffices to prove that σ ∪× σ′ ⊆ BR4(σ ∪× σ′). Let s be in σ ∪× σ′.
If s is in σ then it is also in BR4(σ) by equilibrium assumption. So for all s′ in
Sa, there exists c in σ−a such that ¬(s⊳
{c}
a s′), and each of these c also belongs
to σ−a ∪× σ′−a. Therefore s is in BR
4(σ ∪× σ′). Same scenario if s is in σ′. So
σ ∪× σ′ ⊆ BR4(σ ∪× σ′). 
6.2 Example
The proof of existence of an ndbr equilibrium is constructive, so it provides for
free an algorithm that computes such an equilibrium. The time complexity of
the algorithm is polynomial with respect to the number of strategy profiles |S|
(when each agent has at least two available strategies). Indeed informally, each
call to BR dismisses at least one strategy of one agent, so it dismisses at least
one profile. Therefore BR is called at most |S| times. Each use of BR invokes
all the BRa, which needs (at most) to consider each agent strategy and decide
whether or not this strategy is a best response. So there are at most |S| such
decisions. Such a decision requires at most 3 × |S| calls to a ⊳a. Therefore the
time complexity of finding an equilibrium is at most cubic in the number of
profiles |S|. This is a very rough approximation whose only purpose is to show
that complexity is polynomial.
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The example below is a strategic game with natural-valued payoff functions.
Preference between naturals invokes the usual total order over the naturals. Let
us apply the equilibrium algorithm to the game.
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5
v1 0 0 3 2 2 2 2 1 3 0
v2 3 3 0 2 0 0 2 1 3 2
v3 2 2 1 0 0 1 3 1 0 2
v4 1 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 0
v5 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Informally, V may ”play” either v1 or v2 or v3 or v4 or v5. In that context,
column h5 is smaller than h1 according to agent H , so h5 is not a best response
of agent H . In the same way row v5 is smaller than row v3. In addition, row v4
is not a best response of agent V because for each column hi, row v4 is smaller
than some other row. Therefore, the combined best responses for the whole game
are rows v1 to v3 and columns h1 to h4, as shown below.
h1 h2 h3 h4
v1 0 0 3 2 2 2 2 1
v2 3 3 0 2 0 0 2 1
v3 2 2 1 0 0 1 3 1
Now, agent V may play either v1 or v2 or v3. Column h4 is not a best response
of agent H because for each row v1 to v3, column h4 is smaller than some other
column. So the game ”shrinks” again as show below.
h1 h2 h3
v1 0 0 3 2 2 2
v2 3 3 0 2 0 0
v3 2 2 1 0 0 1
In the same way, for columns h1 to h3, row v3 is smaller than some other
row.
h1 h2 h3
v1 0 0 3 2 2 2
v2 3 3 0 2 0 0
Column h3 is smaller than column h2. This yield the following irreducible
game.
h1 h2
v1 0 0 3 2
v2 3 3 0 2
Therefore {v1, v2}×{h1, h2} is a non deterministic equilibrium for the original
game.
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6.3 Comparisons
Consider the following class of games G, where ∗ can take two values, namely 1
and −1, and where the preferences are along the usual order −1 < 1.
h1 h2
v1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
v2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
For each agent, the arithmetic mean of its payoff over the four payoff functions
of all games in the class is 0, by a ”simple symmetry”. However for each agent, the
arithmetic mean of its payoff over the payoff functions inside the ndbr equilibrium
of all games in the class is 3/8.
Lemma 32 For a game g in G, let eq(g) be the ndbr equilibrium built by the
proof of lemma 26.
1
|G|
×
∑
g∈G
1
|e(g)|
×
∑
s∈eq(g)
P (s, v) =
3
8
Proof In the games of class G, considering only the payoffs of one agent
yields matrices like below. The first row displays the matrices whose two rows
are equivalent to agent v (the agent choosing the row of the matrix). The second
row displays the matrices whose two rows are not equivalent to agent v. The
figure on the top of matrices represent how many actual matrices they represent
up to rotation.
1 2 2 1
1 1
1 1
1 −1
1 −1
1 −1
−1 1
−1 −1
−1 −1
4 2 4
1 1
1 −1
1 1
−1 −1
1 −1
−1 −1
The payoff that is induced by the first matrix is 1: whatever may be the
matrix of agent h, agent v gets 1. In the same way, the fourth matrix induces −1.
Now assume that the payoff matrix of agent v is the second one. When the payoff
matrix of agent h ranges over the matrices above, eq(g) will involve sometimes
only the left-hand side, sometimes only the right-hand side and sometimes (the
same number of times by symmetry), and sometimes both. So on average, the
third matrix yields payoff 0. Same scenario for the third matrix.
The payoff that is induced by the sixth matrix is 1. The fifth matrix induces
payoff 1 too, because an equilibrium involves only the first row whatever the
matrix of agent h is. As to the seventh matrix it induces payoff 0 ”by symmetry”,
because an equilibrium involves only the first row whatever the matrix of agent
h is. Therefore the arithmetic mean is 1+4+2−116 =
3
8 . 
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The rest of the subsection establishes a connection between the non deter-
ministic equilibria of abstract strategic games and the or-best response strict
equilibria of abstract strategic games seen as BR games.
Lemma 33 Let g = 〈A, S, P, (⊳a)a∈A〉 be an abstract strategic game. Assume
that the ⊳a are strict partial orders, i.e. irreflexive and transitive. For each agent
a and each γ in Σ−a, the following defines a subset of Sa.
BR3a(γ)
∆
= {s ∈ Sa | ∃c ∈ γ, ∀s
′ ∈ Sa, ¬(s⊳
{c}
a s
′)}
The object g3 = 〈A, S, (BR3a)a∈A〉 is an ndbr multi strategic game.
For each agent a and each s in S, the following defines a non-empty subset
of S, more specifically an element of Σ.
BR′a(s)
∆
= {s−a} × {s
′ ∈ Sa | ∀s
′′ ∈ Sa, ¬(s
′
⊳
{s−a}
a s
′′)}
The object g′ = 〈A, S, (BR′a)a∈A〉 is a BR game. Then the following holds.
Eq+g′(C) ⇒ Eqg(p(C))
Where p(C) =
⊗
a∈A pa(C) is the smallest (for set inclusion) ndbr multi strategy
profile including C.
Proof By lemma 27, g3 is an ndbr multi strategic game, and by lemma 5,
g′ is a BR game. By assumption and by definition of or-best response strict
equilibrium, C = BR′∪(C). One must show that p(C) ⊆ BR3(p(C)). Let s be
in p(C). It suffices to prove that sa is in BR
3
a(p−a(C)) for all a. Let a be an
agent. By definition of p, sa is in pa(C), and by definition of pa there exists
c in S−a such that c; sa is in C. Such a c is in p−a(C). Let s1 →a s2 stand
for s2 ∈ BR′a(s1) and → stand for ∪a∈A →a. Case split on whether or not
c; sa →a c; sa. If c; sa →a c; sa then, by definition, ¬sa⊳
{c}
a s′) for all s′ in Sa,
so sa is in BR
3
a(p−a(C)). Now assume that c; sa 6→a c; sa. By definition, BR
′
a
returns non-empty sets, so c; sa 6→a c; s′a for some s
′
a 6= sa. Recall that C is a
→ strongly connected component, so c; s′a →
+ c; sa, where →
+ is the transitive
closure of →. This decomposes in c; s′a →
+ c′; s′′a →a c
′; sa →+ c; sa for some c′
and s′′a . More specifically, c
′; s′′a →a c
′; sa, with c
′ in p−a(C). This implies that
sa is in BR
3
a(p−a(C)). 
The ndbr equilibrium given by the implication Eq+g′(C) ⇒ Eqg(p(C)) above
is not always strict. More specifically, the following example shows that Eq+g′(C)∧
¬Eq+g (p(C)) for some or-best response equilibrium C. The example involves
three agents each of whose converts along one dimension of the cube. Outcomes
are payoff functions. The three nodes linked by doublelines constitute an or-best
response strict equilibrium. The projection of the equilibrium is made of the four
upper nodes, and the combined best response to this is the whole cube due to
the two right-hand nodes in the back.
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1, 1, 1 0, 0, 0
1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
0, 0, 0 1, 1, 1
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
7 Discrete and Static Compromising Equilibrium for
multi Strategic Games
This section defines multi strategic games and their non deterministic strat-
egy profiles. Then, it defines a notion of preference among sequences of sets
of outcomes, which yields a notion of (global) nd equilibrium. An embedding
of these multi strategic games into the ndbr multi strategic games shows that
multi strategic games always have an nd equilibrium. Since sequential graph
games can be embedded into multi strategic games, this also provides sequential
graph games with a notion of nd equilibrium that enjoys guarantee of existence.
More subtle notions of equilibrium could be defined, which would yield stronger
results. However, the notion that is defined here intends to be a simple one.
In addition, the section discusses a relevant embedding of strategic games into
multi strategic games.
multi strategic games have a graph-like structure. At each node of the game,
all agents play a strategic game to choose the outcome as well as the move to
the next node. Another strategic game corresponds to this next node. So, a play
in a multi strategic game is an infinite sequence of local plays in strategic games
followed by outcomes. The notion of multi strategic game is defined below.
Definition 34 (multi strategic game) A multi strategic game is a pair 〈S, (Pn)n∈V 〉
that complies with the following.
– S =
⊗
n∈V
⊗
a∈A S
n
a , where V is a non-empty set of indices, A is a non-
empty set of agents, and Sna is a non-empty set of strategies.
– Pn is of type Sn → OC × V , where Oc is a non-empty set of outcomes.
The agents’ (pure) strategies are the elements of Sa =
⊗
n∈V S
n
a and the (pure)
strategy profiles are the elements of S.
The following example depicts a multi strategic game that involves two
agents, say vertical and horizontal. At each node vertical chooses the row
and horizontal chooses the column. The game involves natural-valued payoff
functions. The first figure corresponds to agent vertical and the second figure
to agent horizontal. At a node, if a payoff function is enclosed in a small box
with an arrow pointing from the bow to another node, it means that the cor-
responding strategy profile leads to this other node. If a payoff function is not
enclosed in a small box, it means that the corresponding strategy profile leads
to the same node. For instance below, If the play start at the top-left node and
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if the agents choose the top-left profile, then both agents get payoff 2 and the
same strategic game is played again. Whereas if the agents choose the top-right
profile, vertical gets payoff 2 and horizontal gets payoff 1, and the agents have
to play in the top-right node.
2, 2 2, 1
0, 4 1, 4
2, 2 2, 4
4, 2 3, 3
0, 1 3, 0
Starting from every node, a strategy profile induces infinite sequences of out-
comes. It is therefore possible to define local/global equilibria for multi strategic
games in the same way that they are defined for sequential graph games. Then,
it is possible to embed sequential graph games into multi strategic games in a
way that preserves and reflects local/global equilibria. (The embedding consists
in seeing a node of a sequential graph game as a 1-agent strategic game.)
It is possible to embed strategic games into multi strategic games such that
Nash equilibria correspond to local/global equilibria. (The embedding consists
in seeing a strategic game as a one-node multi strategic game looping on itself).
However, since not all strategic games have a Nash equilibrium, not all multi
strategic games have a local/global equilibrium. That is why non determinism
comes into play.
Definition 35 (non deterministic strategies and profiles) Let 〈S, (Pn)n∈V 〉
be a multi strategic game. Let Σna
∆
= P(Sna )−{∅} be the set of local nd strategies
of agent a at node n. Let Σa
∆
=
⊗
n∈V Σ
n
a be the set of nd strategies of agent a
(accounting for choices at all nodes). Let Σ
∆
=
⊗
a∈AΣa be the set of nd strategy
profiles. Also, let Σn
∆
=
⊗
a∈AΣ
n
a be the set of local nd strategy profiles at node
n. For σ in Σ, the objects σa, σ
n, and σna correspond to the projections of σ on
Σa, Σ
n, and Σna .
Consider an nd strategy profile. At a given node, the outcome and the next
node that are prescribed by the profile may be undetermined, because of non
determinism. However, the outcome is element of a determined set of outcomes
and the next node is element of a determined set of nodes. The same phenomenon
arises at each possible next nodes. Therefore, any path starting from a node and
non deterministically following the prescription of the nd strategy profile yields
a sequence whose kth element is element of a determined set of outcomes. These
sets are defined below.
Definition 36 (Induced sequence of sets of outcomes) Let g = 〈S, (Pn)n∈V 〉
be a multi strategic game and let σ be in Σ. The induced sequence seq(σ, n) is
an infinite sequence of non-empty subsets of outcomes.
seq(σ, n)
∆
= fst ◦ Pn(σn) · seq(σ, snd ◦ Pn(σn))
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Where f(Z) = ∪x∈Zf(x) for any f : X → Y and Z ⊆ X, and the projection
operations are defined such that fst((x, y)) = x and snd((x, y)) = y.
Inclusion of nd strategy profiles implies component-wise inclusion of their
sequences of sets of outcomes, as stated below.
Lemma 37 Let g = 〈S, (Pn)n∈V 〉 be a multi strategic game.
σ ⊆ σ′ ⇒ ∀n ∈ V, ∀k ∈ N, seq(σ, n)(k) ⊆ seq(σ′, n)(k)
For every agent, a preference binary relation over outcomes can be extended
to a preference over sequences of sets of outcomes, as defined below. This ex-
tended preference amounts to component-wise preference for all sets in the se-
quence. However, there are other ”natural” ways of extending preference over
outcomes to preference over sequences of sets of outcomes (using limit sets or
lexicographic ordering, for instance). So, what follows is only an example.
Definition 38 (Preference over sequences) Let ≺ be a binary relation over
a set E. It can be extended to non-empty subsets of E as follows.
X ≺set Y
∆
= ∀x ∈ X, ∀y ∈ Y, x ≺ y
This can be extended to sequences of non-empty subsets of E. Below, α and β
are sequences of non-empty subsets of E.
α ≺fct β
∆
= ∀k ∈ N, α(k) ≺set β(k)
The definition of ≺set implies the following result.
Lemma 39 ∅ 6= X ′ ⊆ X ∧ ∅ 6= Y ′ ⊆ Y ∧ X ≺set Y ⇒ X ′ ≺set Y ′
Next lemma states that the preference extension ≺fct preserves an ordering
property.
Lemma 40 If ≺ is a strict partial order then ≺fct is also a strict partial order.
The following result shows a preservation property involving ≺fct and strat-
egy inclusion.
Lemma 41 Let g = 〈S, (Pn)n∈V 〉 be a sequential graph game. Assume that
γ ⊆ δ are both in Σ−a. Then the following holds.
seq(δ;σa, n)⊳
fct
a seq(δ;σ
′
a, n) ⇒ seq(γ;σa, n)⊳
fct
a seq(γ;σ
′
a, n)
Proof By assumption and definition, seq(δ;σa, n)(k)⊳
set
a seq(δ;σ
′
a, n)(k) for
all k in N. Since γ ⊆ δ, lemma 37 implies that seq(γ;σa, n)(k) ⊆ seq(δ;σa, n)(k)
and seq(γ;σ′a, n)(k) ⊆ seq(δ;σ
′
a, n)(k). Since these sets are all non-empty and
by lemma 39, seq(γ;σa, n)(k)⊳
set
a seq(γ;σ
′
a, n)(k) for all k. 
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Below, multi strategic game are embedded into ndbr multi strategic games.
The corresponding ndbr multi strategic games always has an ndbr equilibrium,
which is interpreted as multi strategic games always having an nd equilibrium.
However, the embedding is not the only relevant one. It is intended to be a simple
one. More subtle embeddings can yield to stronger results of nd equilibrium
existence.
Lemma 42 Let g = 〈S, (Pn)n∈V 〉 be a multi strategic game. For each agent
a, assume that his preference over outcomes ⊳a are strict partial orders, i.e.
irreflexive and transitive. For each agent a and each γ in Σ−a, the following
defines an element of Σa.
BRa(γ)
∆
=
⊗
i∈I
BRna (γ)
Where
BRna (γ)
∆
= {sn | s ∈ Sa ∧ ∀s
′ ∈ Sa, ¬(seq(γ; s, n)⊳
fct
a seq(γ; s
′, n))}
The object 〈(Sna )
n∈V
a∈A , (BRa)a∈A〉 is an ndbr multi strategic game, and it has an
ndbr equilibrium.
Proof First prove that BRna (γ) is non-empty: the set of the seq(γ; s, n), when
s ranges over Sa, is finite and non-empty. So at least one of the seq(γ; s, n)
is maximal with respect to ⊳fcta which is a strict partial order by lemma 40.
Second, assume that γ ⊆ δ for γ and δ in Σ−a and prove BRna (γ) ⊆ BR
n
a (δ):
let c be in BRna (γ). By definition, c = s
n for some strategy s in Sa such that
¬(seq(γ; s, n)⊳fcta seq(γ; s
′, n)) for all s′ in Sa. So ¬(seq(δ; s, n)⊳fcta seq(δ; s
′, n))
for all s′ in Sa, by contraposition of lemma 41. So c belongs to BR
n
a (δ). Therefore,
the ndbr multi strategic game has an ndbr equilibrium by lemma 21. 
In the lemma above, the definition of BR says that at a given node and in a
given context (other agents have chosen their nd strategies), an agent dismisses
any of its options that induces a sequence worse than a sequence induced by some
other option. Since the result above is constructive, it provides an algorithm for
finding an nd equilibrium. An example is given below. The game involves two
agents, namely vertical and horizontal. Agent vertical chooses the rows and is
rewarded with the first figures given by the payoff functions.
2, 2 2, 1
0, 4 1, 4
2, 2 2, 4
4, 2 3, 3
0, 1 3, 0
In the beginning, all agents consider all of their options. At the bottom node,
only agent horizontal has an actual decision to take. If he chooses right, he gets
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an infinite sequence of 0. (vertical gets an infinite sequence of 3, but horizontal
does not take it into account.) If he chooses left, he gets an infinite sequence of
(non-zero) positive numbers whatever vertical’s strategy may be, which is better
than 0 at any stage of the sequence. So horizontal dismisses his right strategy
at the bottom node, as depicted below.
2, 2 2, 1
0, 4 1, 4
2, 2 2, 4
4, 2 3, 3
0, 1
Now agent vertical considers the top-left node. If he chooses his bottom
strategy, the induced sequence involves only 0 and 1. If he choose his top strategy,
the induced sequence involves only numbers that are equal to or greater than 2,
which is better. So vertical dismisses his top strategy at the top-left node node,
as depicted below.
2, 2 2, 1
2, 2 2, 4
4, 2 3, 3
0, 1
Now agent horizontal considers the top-right node. If he chooses his left
strategy, the induced sequence involves only 1 and 2. If he choose his right
strategy, the induced sequence involves only 3 and 4, which is better. So agent
horizontal dismisses his left strategy at the top-right node, as depicted below.
2, 2 2, 1
2, 4
3, 3
0, 1
Eventually, agent vertical dismisses one of his strategy at the top-right node,
which yields the global nd equilibrium below. Said otherwise, for each agent, fore
each node, the agent cannot get better sequence by changing his strategy.
2, 2 2, 1 3, 3
0, 1
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Since sequential graph games can be embedded into multi strategic games,
lemma 26 also provides a notion of global nd equilibrium for sequential graph
games, with the guarantee of equilibrium existence. However, it is also possible
to define more subtle notions of equilibrium with this guarantee.
8 Conclusion
This paper introduces the notion of abstract strategic game, which is a nat-
ural and minimalist abstraction of traditional strategic games with real-valued
payoff functions. It also defines the notion of multi strategic game which is a gen-
eralisation of both abstract strategic games and sequential graph games. multi
strategic games can therefore model decision-making problems that are mod-
elled by either strategic games or sequential graph/tree games. Since these new
games can express both sequential and simultaneous decision-making within the
same game, they can also model more complex decision-making problems. The
paper also defines non deterministic best response multi strategic games. While
somewhat more abstract, they are structurally similar to multi strategic games:
Cartesian product and graph-like structure. Via a pre-fixed point result that is
also proved in the paper, existence of ndbr equilibrium is guaranteed for ndbr
multi strategic games (under some sufficient condition). Instantiating this result
with (more) concrete best response functions provides different notions of non
deterministic equilibrium for multi strategic games. A few examples show the
effectiveness of the approach, in terms of numerical result as well as algorithmic
complexity (polynomial and low). This approach is discrete and static, so it lies
between Nash’s probabilistic approach and the CP an BR approach.
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